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Research on microfinance in India: combining impact assessment with a 
broader development perspective.  
James Copestake, University of Bath, UK.1 
September 2011. 
 
Abstract: Microfinance can be researched narrowly as an instrument for 
promoting development or more broadly as an endogenous component of 
development. The paper sets out a simple well-being regime model incorporating 
both views and uses it to review the dynamics of rural microfinance in India. Four 
potential drivers of change in the role of microfinance in India are reviewed: 
evidence-based policy, rising political aspirations, new technology and agro-
climatic change. The paper argues for combining more narrowly focused 
microfinance impact assessment with broader research into microfinance as one 
component of wider well-being regimes. 
 
Key words: development research, impact assessment, microfinance, rural 
development, well-being regimes, India. 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper is motivated by ongoing debate over both the commercialization and 
what can provocatively be called the medicalization of microfinance. The first 
refers to the assumption (notwithstanding the 2008-9 financial crisis) that 
microfinance is inevitably becoming integrated into global financial markets, and 
the second to the growing popularity among agencies supporting microfinance of 
a normative medical metaphor for aid: namely, that ‘treatments’ such as 
microcredit should be applied to selected groups only on the basis of rigorous 
demonstration of their positive impact on measurable outcome indicators, 
preferably based on randomized control trials. While both perspectives have their 
merits, the fact that they take such strikingly different positions on the tension 
between structure and agency suggests a continued need to consider 
microfinance from other perspectives also. 
To this end the paper first advocates reviewing the relationship between 
microfinance and development within a broad well-being regime framework. The 
argument is then developed through an unsystematic but wide-ranging survey of 
the secondary literature on rural microfinance in India.2 The remainder of this 
                                                 
1 j.g.copestake@bath.ac.uk. This paper was first presented at a workshop in January 
2010 organized by the Centre for Research into Microfinance in Brussels on 
microfinance and development studies. I am grateful to participants for comments, 
particularly Cyril Fouillet, and to Julie Humberstone for assistance in searching the 
literature.  
2 Some degree of order was introduced through a systematic search for abstracts that 
referred to (a) India or regions thereof (b) poverty or related concepts (c) microfinance or 
related instruments (d) impact or related concepts. This covered four databases 
(EconLit, IBSS, ISI Web of Knowledge and Business Source Premier) going back to 
1991. Obvious flaws in this search strategy include omission of the rich literature on 
microfinance in India in languages other than English, and failure to pick up 
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section defines development as the adaptive evolution of national well-being 
regimes, of which microfinance is one component. Section 2 briefly applies the 
framework to India’s recent history. Section 3 develops the analysis further by 
reviewing research into the relationship between rural microfinance and four 
potential drivers of change: evidence based policy, rising political aspirations, 
new information and communication technology (ICT), and food insecurity linked 
to climate change. Section 4 addresses implications for discussion of 
microfinance research priorities, concluding with a warning against policy-
oriented impact assessment crowding out broader and more open-ended 
research. 
The term microfinance is used to refer to institutions of saving, credit, 
insurance and money transfer used by relatively poor people. Most analysis of 
microfinance is framed as a micro-level issue, centered on the behavior of 
specific users and providers. However, such analysis is also unavoidably - if 
often implicitly - framed by a wider view of how the state, markets and society 
jointly determine the distribution of well-being and poverty. For example, public 
support for private microfinance institutions (MFIs) might be viewed both  
positively and negatively: for example, as a means to promoting financial 
inclusion by ‘making markets work for the poor’, or as political cover for state 
retreat from more comprehensive social insurance commitments. And both views  
are conceivably be compatible with a “pluralist liberal orthodoxy” that seeks to 
identify the least worst combination of state, market and civic mechanisms for 
addressing poverty in countries where all three are deeply compromised by other 
political priorities and interests (Brett, 2009). Variation in such constraints over 
time and space creates path dependencies and limits the usefulness of 
evaluating particular financial mechanisms against any universal theory of 
development.  
One way to contextualize analysis of microfinance is to view it as part of 
an evolving national well-being regime. This approach can be traced back to 
classical political economy, refashioned through comparative social policy, 
particularly under the influence of Polanyi and Esping-Anderson (Gough & Wood, 
2004). The main emphasis in this paper is on well-being regimes at the national 
level, though there is potential to extend the analysis at global and sub-national 
levels also. The broad framework is captured in its simplest form by Figure 1. 
This depicts a feedback loop whereby from any given starting point (determined 
by an endowment of exogenous conditioning factors) an institutional matrix of 
state, market, civil society (including community) and household mechanisms 
distribute resources in such a way as to determine the distribution of well-being 
outcomes across the population.3  
                                                                                                                                                 
anthropological research that touches on microfinance indirectly as one element of 
agrarian social relations. The paper also predates the 2010 ‘crisis’ of microfinance in 
Andhra Pradesh, which further illustrates the central argument in favour of broadening 
the framework of analysis of how microfinance relates to development. 
3 Drawing on Powelson (1997) as well as North (1990), the term institution is taken to 
refer to rules and norms governing resource allocation that are protected by culture, in 
the sense that non-compliance with them provokes widespread outrage and a political 
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Well-being is defined broadly to include human capabilities, opportunities 
and emotional states including life, liberty and happiness.4 The term is used in 
preference to ‘welfare’ to signal a break with the assumption that individuals 
operate solely on the basis of material self-interest and that institutions persist 
solely as a consequence of their functional contribution to individual and 
collective material interests. This is not to deny the power of such political 
economy perspectives, but to acknowledge the importance of other social 
processes, including the politics of identity and recognition. One further 
clarification is that notwithstanding use of the term well-being, the framework 
aims primarily to inform positive rather than normative analysis; thus a particular 
well-being regime may more appropriately be referred to as an insecurity regime, 
for example.5 
A given well-being outcome triggers a set of reproduction consequences. 
These include changes in wealth, power, perception and capacity of different 
groups for collective action to alter the institutional matrix, and hence future well-
being outcomes through processes of cumulative causation. Outcomes may also 
have deeper effects on the conditioning factors underpinning the institutional 
matrix. However, implicit in the idea of a ‘regime’ is the assumption that radical 
system change or breakdown is an exception to the norm. For example, business 
and political cycles along with deeper fluctuations in the balance of power 
between state, market and civil society do not amount of themselves to regime 
change if they trigger ‘corrective’ feedback.   
One possible use of this framework is to assess the systemic role of 
specific components of the institutional matrix. If a particular institution, such as 
rural debt, persists over time then this suggests it plays a role in overall regime 
stability, and it is useful to understand how, as well as why attempts to change it 
are likely to be resisted. Its role can then be further explored by appraising how it 
will be affected by exogenous shocks. 
Potential well-being outcomes of microfinance include capacity to save, to 
take and spread risks, to smooth consumption, to meet lumpy expentiture needs 
and investment opportunities, and to make and receive transfers easily (Collins 
et al., 2009). Technical change that improves access to such services by 
lowering transactions costs can enhance these outcomes. If users experience 
reduced vulnerability and are able to accumulate assets then this has potentially 
benign expanded reproduction possibilities, including a virtuous cycle of financial 
inclusion as poor people raise their debt-capacity and this in turn reduces unit 
costs of microfinance even further. 
                                                                                                                                                 
reaction in their defence. The framework can be elaborated further by incorporating 
Williamson’s (2000) distinction between four levels of institutions.    
4 This echoes the Wellbeing in Developing Countries (WeD) network definition of well-
being as “a state of being in society where people’s basic needs are met, where they 
can act effectively and meaningfully in pursuit of their goals and where they feel satisfied 
with their life” (Copestake, 2008:3). 
5 For other examples, see Bevan in Gough & Wood (2004) on in/security regimes in 
Africa, and Copestake & Wood in Copestake (2008) on Peru as an unequal security 
regime.  
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Conversely, access to financial services only on the most adverse terms 
can foster over-indebtedness, dependency, poverty and low aspirations. It is 
implicit in the definition of microfinance that access to finance is segmented by 
income, whether because technology is not scale-neutral or because poorer 
users face discrimination. In short, microfinance can also play a key role in the 
reproduction of inequality. On the supply side, unequal ownership and control of 
microfinance services can also contribute to the reproduction of poverty and 
inequality. 
 
 
 
 
More radical feedback loops are possible via the conditioning factors governing 
finance, including generalized trust across markets and the influence on 
economic growth of the institutions governing creditor risk (Fergusson, 2006). 
The distributional consequences are again important, such as whether improved 
governance at the top end of the financial market has positive spillover effects on 
lower market segments or reinforces institutional dualism (Figueroa, 2009). 
This analysis highlights potential dangers of separating analysis of 
services for the poor from those available for the rich. Too strong a focus on 
individual access to microfinance risks contributing to neglect of financing 
collective needs of poor people, including physical infrastructure, security, health 
and education services.At worst, it can be a smokescreen for deeper structural 
forces, and sustain overly simplistic rhetoric of equality of opportunity. These 
arguments help to explain why social scientists have treated donor interest in 
financial inclusion cautiously (Fernando, 2006; Weber, 2004). At the same time a 
broad-brush sectoral view of development finance risks reducing the focus on 
poverty and distribution (Johnson, 2009). 
CONDITIONING 
FACTORS,  
Social differentiation 
Natural resources  
Technology  
External relations 
State structures 
Wealth distribution  
WELL-BEING OUTCOMES 
Capabilities and need satisfaction 
Freedoms and opportunities 
Emotions and motivations 
REPRODUCTION 
CONSEQUENCES 
Simple or expanded  
Inclusionary or exclusionary 
 
INSTITUTIONAL MATRIX 
State 
Markets 
Community or civil society 
Household 
Figure 1: A simple framework for well-being regime analysis 
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A second possible danger arising from an overly narrow focus on 
microfinance is that it neglects the way differentiated access to financial services 
is interlinked with other components of the institutional matrix. A potential 
advantage of microfinance is that it frees individual users to make use of 
improved liquidity as they see fit. Likewise the shift from solidarity based peer-
lending mechanisms to more flexible and open-ended individual lending is more 
likely to be benificial by reducing loan transaction costs and thereby facilitating 
scaling-up. However, this neglects evidence of the resilience of interlinkage 
between microfinance and other services, as well as the rationale for more 
radical strategies for poverty reduction that rely on combining financial and other 
interventions.  
Linked to this is the trend towards downplaying the spatial segmentation of 
microfinance. Rural urbanization, increased spatial mobility and improved 
communications all help to explain why location matters less than it used to for 
many people, and why models based on simple rural-urban or formal-informal 
dualities are misleading. But poverty remains overwhelmingly rural in many parts 
of the world, and villages a repository of deep geographical and cultural 
constraints to market intergration. The potential impact of microfinance may 
hinge less on the value of financial resources transferred than on their potential 
negative and positive impact on social relations underpinning poverty, including 
clientelism and capacity for collective action. 
 
2.  The case of India 
The previous section presented a simple framework for viewing microfinance as 
part of a broader historical-institutional analysis of development as the evolution 
of national well-being regimes. This section provides a brief worked example, 
comprising an historical overview of rural microfinance as one component of 
India’s well-being regime.  
My own first-hand experience of doing field work on rural credit in Tamil 
Nadu during the 1980s at times seemed to entail not just “reconstructing 
landscapes” (Bouman & Hospes, 1994) but also what might be called financial 
systems archeology. Each visit to a cramped primary agricultural credit 
cooperative, bank branch or half-empty government office revealed further 
corners of a labyrinth of financial initiatives: privileged conduits of new money 
lying over the clogged pipes of long neglected schemes. At the same time, I also 
marveled at the scale and resilience of some of these historic institutions: the 
survival from one government to next of the cooperative system as a conduit for 
short-term agricultural credit; the continued operation of remote branches of 
commercial banks and regional rural banks (RRBs), the perpetuation of IRDP as 
an instrument of central government patronage long after its launch in 1979 
(Copestake, 1996), and the myriad shoe-string Gandhian programmes for 
supporting village industry and self-reliance.6 Harder to unearth but equally 
                                                 
6 Despite chronic weaknesses, the short-term cooperative credit system still had 127 
million members in 2005, including 45 million who received loans (Government of India, 
2008:73). IRDP was rebranded as SGSY in 1999 and subsequently became a major 
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important to well-being outcomes were the pervasive root systems of informal 
money-lending and indebtedness (Shah et al., 2007).  
State sponsored rural credit was also only one component of a wider 
regime of public spending that also encompassed investment in infrastructure, a 
plethora of nutrition and employment creation schemes, and subsidized supply of 
electricity, food, fertilizer and other agricultural services. While debate raged over 
the strengths and weaknesses of rival schemes, criticism was also growing of the 
cost, inefficiency and perverse incentives to innovation of the whole rural subsidy 
regime. How far was this the product of a benign, if high-handed and paternalistic 
developmental state, and how far had it degenerated into a parasitical and often 
openly corrupt patronage system? With gloriously disingenuous hindsight, some 
commentators wrapped the whole experience of dirigiste social banking up with 
the ‘licence raj’, labelled it ‘rent-seeking’ and consigned it to the dustbin of history 
(e.g. Farrell and Lund, 2006). In contrast, more measured historical assessments 
confirmed significant positive links from rural bank branch and credit expansion 
to faster agricultural growth (Binswanger & Khandker, 1995) and poverty 
reduction (Burgess & Pande, 2005).  
After the shock of the external crisis of 1991, and taking the Narisimham 
Committee report of that year as its blueprint, the BJP government did begin to 
restrict the flow of public credit to priority sectors and backward regions. But the 
number of rural bank branches, which peaked at 35,396 in 1993-94, still 
exceeded 30,000 in 2005-6; while the total number of loan accounts below Rs 
25,000 fell from a peak of 63 million in 1991-2 to a trough of 37 million in 2003-4 
before beginning to rise again (Pillarisetti, 2007:28-30). Debt outstanding with 
moneylenders, evident from successive rounds of the National Sample Survey, 
mirrored these changes (Pillarisetti, 2007:31). Other commentators provide a 
more thorough review (Ramachandran & Swaminathan, 2005; Shah et al., 2007). 
While acknowledging that they were in part legitimized by the scale of corruption 
and waste associated with some regions and programmes (particularly 
IRDP/SGSY in the North and East) they argue that the reforms also reflected a 
political swing away from rural and farming constituencies in favour of the 
growing urban middle-class.7   
In contrast, the victory of the United Progressive Alliance in May 2004 can 
be interpreted as a popular reaction against a thirteen year swing towards a 
market-led model of development. Since then there has been at least some 
public reaffirmation of the importance of both rural finance and public investment 
in rural infrastructure as part of a well-being regime focused on achieving social 
inclusion through a combination of increased democratic participation and 
                                                                                                                                                 
source of funding for self-help groups. Rajasekhar (2006) reviews its coverage and 
operational weaknesses for the five years to 2003-4. On RRBs, see Kaushik (1996). 
7 More recently Chakraborty and Dasgupta (2010) describe the adverse effect of anti-
inflationary sterilization of private capital inflows by the Reserve Bank of India on the 
supply of capital for rural lending via NABARD. The offsetting positive contribution of 
foreign capital inflows to rural microfinance via investment in MFIs is likely to have been 
much smaller. 
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“inclusive growth” (Thorat, 2008).8 The Rangajaran report of the Committee on 
Financial Inclusion (GOI, 2008:42-44) set a target of providing “comprehensive 
financial services” by 2012 to 50 percent of the 65 million cultivator and 47 million 
non-cultivator households identified by the 2003 NSS study as lacking access to 
formal financial services.  
An important link from pre-1991 to current credit policy has been the 
growth of the Self-Help Group (SHG) movement. This emerged during the 1980s, 
particularly in the Southern States and through the social intermediation of rural 
development oriented NGOs (Fisher, et al. 2002). The role of SHGs as 
intermediaries between individual clients - mostly women - and the banking 
system accelerated particularly after NABARD launched the National Self-Help 
Group Bank Linkage Program (SBLP) in 1992. In April 2001, 285,000 self-help 
groups (SHGs) had taken loans from commercial banks, regional rural banks and 
cooperative banks through NABARD’s self-help group-bank linkage program 
(SBLP).  With an estimated average of 17 members per group, it could thereby 
claim to reach approximately 4.5 million people (Fisher, et al. 2002).  By 2009, in 
contrast the number of people accessing formal credit and savings through SBLP 
had increased to 63.6 million, through 3.47 million SHGs (Sa-Dhan, 2009a:2; 
Srinivasan, 2008). The SBLP approach has been praised for its ability to 
increase outreach and described as India’s dominant mode of microfinance 
(Basu 2006). Financial support has not only been routed via banks under the 
SBLP but also through a rapid expansion in the number and size of specialized 
microfinance institutions (MFIs). By 2008, 233 MFIs reached 22.6 million clients 
independently of SBLP, with 62% of this outreach being accounted for by for-
profit MFIs (Sa-Dhan, 2009b:ii).  
 However, rapid growth of lending through SHGs and MFIs has also 
generated a new set of challenges and concerns (Basu 2006; Sa-Dahn 2009a; 
Srinivasan 2008). Some MFIs promoting SHGs overstretched their management 
systems, and others with weaker management and governance also began to 
engage in SHG promotion. By transforming into for-profit entities in pursuit of 
faster growth some of the largest MFIs have also come under attack for 
abandoning the philosophy underpinning SHGs, neglecting the poorest and using 
public funds for personal enrichment (e.g. T.Nair, 2010; Sriram, 2010). 
Competition amongst microfinance organizations also increased, and in some 
areas this has resulted in multiple borrowing and over-indebtedness. In 2006, 
MFIs in Andhra Pradesh were accused by politicians and the media of charging 
usurious interest rates and of unethical debt collection techniques that 
contributed to the wave of suicides among indebted farmers. The MFIs in turn 
attacked state subsidies to SHGs, and the effect of debt forgiveness benefitting 
nearly 40 million farmers – a political response that signaled regime continuity 
between the SHG model as a modality of rural finance and many of the credit 
initiatives that preceded it.  
                                                 
8 In addition to the SBLP programme, discussed below, Thorat (2008:5) identifies the 
establishment of NABARD’s Rural Infrastructure Development Fund and the Small 
Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) as important initiatives taken in the 1990s 
to maintain the flow of development finance to agriculture and other priority sectors. 
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To sum up, state support for rural credit has been a significant and 
resilient component of India’s well-being regime for fifty years, despite numerous 
changes in credit disbursement modalities and a sustained attempt to bring about 
market-oriented forms between 1991 and 2004. And if poverty rates did fall by as 
much as half a percent per year, as contested official statistics suggest 
(Pillarisetti, 2007:22), there are no reliable estimates of the contribution of state 
sponsored rural credit to this fall. Shah et al. (2007) suggest that the scale of the 
commitment to rural credit will indeed be seen with hindsight to have been 
modest and temporary against the backdrop of a century of chronic agrarian 
indebtedness, while the national surveys of rural indebtedness remind us that 
“the commercial money-lending firm remains key to the cycle of production” 
(Harriss-White, 2008:550). 
The analysis of India’s well-being regime could be further elaborated 
through a more detailed investigation not only of changes in the institutional 
matrix, well-being outcomes and reproduction consequences but also of the 
political processes regulating system change. Mooij (2007) points in this direction 
by noting a persistent need for central government to assert the importance of 
progressive social policies and its control over them, while at the same time 
lacking commitment to combat local subversion of their implementation at state 
level and below. Development schemes framed in the language of universal 
citizenship are distorted “…beyond all recognition in implementation such that 
although practical outcomes vary according to local balance of social and political 
forces, they tend to reinforce unequal citizenship.” (Harris-White et al., 2009:3). 
However, to the extent that financial and other forms of liberalization increase 
income polarization (by region, caste, class, ethnicity, gender) so the centre is 
constrained to retain its fiat on compromised mechanisms for disbursing regional 
patronage as a means to the reproduction of national unity. 
 
3. Selected drivers of change in India 
Having provided a rough sketch of how rural microfinance in India fits into a well-
being regime analysis, this section uses the framework to review more specific 
drivers of change. The first of these is the ‘endogenous’ process of deliberative 
reform of the institutional matrix in the light of research into the impact of its 
component parts. The implicit assumption here is that there is sufficient political 
room for manoeuvre to allow policy makers to make rational policy adjustments 
in the light of empirical evidence. We then turn to the relationship between rural 
microfinance and three ‘exogenous’ potential drivers of regime change: (a) rising 
popular aspirations and political responses to them; (b) organizational 
implications of new ICT; (c) food insecurity linked to climate change 
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Evidence based policy adjustment 
The main focus of recent impact research has been the SHG Bank-linkage 
programme. Among the many studies are those carried out by Deininger and Liu 
(2009), Swain and Varghese (2009), Swain and Wallentin (2009), Garikipati 
(2008), Sarkar and De (2005), Puhazhendi and Badatya (2002) and Puhazhendi 
and Satyasai (2001). These generally report some positive economic impact, 
though rarely sufficient to have a dramatic impact on poverty incidence. Few 
loans are used to set up new businesses (Gadenne & Vasudevan 2007; Kalpana 
2008; Sa-Dhan, 2009b).9 Instead they are mostly used either as working capital 
for existing household enterprises, to purchase livestock, or to manage 
consumption flows. Limited impact is variously associated with the small size of 
loans, lack of business opportunities and failure to complement microcredit with 
complementary inputs such as education, training and business development 
services. Most studies also report positive cognitive and attitudinal effects, 
including increased self-confidence, self-esteem and ability to deal with problems 
(e.g. Puhazhendi & Badatya 2002b; Fisher et al. 2002; Boraian, 2003; Holvoet, 
2005b, 2006; Moyle et al. 2006; Bagheri et al., 2007; Sinha 2008). Mohindra et 
al. (2008) also find positive effects of SHG membership on women’s inclusion in 
health care and their mental health. However, evidence of significant and 
tangible positive effects on women’s  decision-making power, control over assets 
and participation in extra-household networks is less pronounced (Puhazhendi & 
Badatya 2002a; Holvoet, 2005a; Sinha 2006; Garikipati 2008; Banerjee et al. 
2009).  
SHGs supported and linked to banks by NGOs are generally found to 
perform better (in terms of targeting, social and economic impact, and repayment 
rates) than SHGs linked directly to banks or by government to banks (Swain & 
Varghese 2009b; Puhazhendi & Satyasai 2001), with government linked SHGs 
tending to perform the worst (Sinha 2008). However, the number of studies that 
systematically compare impact of for-profit MFIs and non-profit SHGs is 
surprisingly small given the extent to which differences in their ideology and 
approach drive policy discussion. Likewise, relatively few studies go on to assess 
the cost-effectiveness of microfinance interventions relative to other anti-poverty 
programmes, such as the Natiional Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(NREGS) or Public Distribution System (PDS). There is also little literature on the 
extent to which impact studies have influenced policy decisions. 
 
Political aspirations 
Rural finance in India cannot be viewed in isolation from the unfolding social 
transformation initiated by the introduction of universal suffrage more than sixty 
                                                 
9 A separate line of research focuses on linkages between microfinance and business 
training. For example, Ghosh (2002) found the impact of the government TRYSEM 
programme in West Bengal to be low, whereas Creevey and Edgerton (1997) report 
positive impact of a World Bank funded pilot in three states. Integrated packages of 
support to promote dairying, especially for women highlight the importance of quality of 
intervention to outcomes (Ramakrishnappa & Jagannatha Rao, 2006; Copestake, 1996; 
Sharma & Vanjani, 1993).   
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years ago and reinforced by the 1992 constitutional amendment (ratified in 2001) 
in favour of political decentralization to panchayat institutions. Rao (2009) 
describes the delegation of decision-making power over public funds to more 
than one million village panchayats as the largest ever experiment in deliberative 
democracy in global history. Despite its many flaws, the electoral processes 
thereby instituted cannot be dismissed as entirely scripted in advance by locally 
or externally dominant groups. Rao also argues that the immediate well-being 
outcomes in terms of voice, dignity and influence are less important than 
expanded reproduction possibilities represented by rising political and material 
aspirations. This suggests a growing need for institutional mechanisms through 
which local, state-level and national politicians can respond to these aspirations, 
and be seen to do so. While transfer programmes (particularly NREGS) have 
been most in the public spotlight microfinance is significant not only its own right 
but as a means to improve payment mechanisms for such schemes (CGAP, 
2009b). And while failures of implementation reduce immediate material 
outcomes, a political purpose is nevertheless served if the programmes provide 
grist to the mill of local and regional political struggles. With respect to 
microfinance, this constitutes the demand side dynamic to match the supply side 
proposals on financial inclusion in the Rangarajan report. At the same time anti-
developmental, sectarian and Naxalite movements will continue to thrive on 
aspiration gaps arising from a failure to improve terms of access to financial and 
other services. 
This brief discussion suggests two sets of research questions. The first is 
to explore positive engagement in the form of direct linkages between financial 
services and the effectiveness of panchayats within the institutional matrix. 
Perhaps the leading example here is integration of the SHG network and 
panchayati raj system through the Kudumbashree programme in Kerala 
(Ramesh, 2010:3623; Deika & Thampi, 2007).10 SHGs and their federations also 
offer a means to increase the density of social networks, communication and 
transparency (institutionalizing suspicion as well as trust) that is critical to 
deliberative democratic processes in general, and women’s empowerment, in 
particular (Holvoet, 2005a; 2005b & 2006; Tiwari, 2010). In contrast, Pattenden 
(2010) labels government and NGO-backed SHGs as a “neo-liberalisation of civil 
society” that deliver marginal material well-being improvements at best, while 
ignoring deeper political and economic inequalities and hence the possibility for 
more radical reproduction consequences. A second and less developed line of 
research concerns the political inter-relationship between SHGs, NGOs, 
government schemes and Naxalite activities (Banerjee & Saha, 2010).  
More generally, the growing literature on aspirations and poverty, 
particularly in the face of increased socio-economic flux and complexity affirm the 
case for researching the diverse “mental models” (North, 1990) that inform how 
individuals frame and respond to new financing opportunities in the face of 
pervasive uncertainty. Physical access to microfinance is often less of a 
constraint to its uptake than basic financial education and socially-embedded 
                                                 
10
 See also Tesoriero (2006) and Copestake et al. (2005:94-125) for further discussion of 
the links between SHG membership, social identity and active citizenship. 
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attitudes to saving and borrowing (Nino-Zarazua & Copestake, 2009). This is 
particularly the case in saturated markets, where stronger NGOs and MFIs can 
act as catalysts for improving financial literacy and rasising the aspirations of 
previously excluded groups (Narendranath, 2005). 
 
New information, communication and financial technology. 
New global information, communication technologies and linked financial 
innovation are partly exogenous to India’s well-being regime, but also in part an 
endogenous response to growing demand for so-called ‘bottom of the pyramid’ 
financial services. Such changes are already having profound effects on 
conventional banks through computerization of back-office activities and the 
extension of ATM networks (Fu & Polzin, 2008). More far-reaching are prospects 
for branchless banking, defined by CGAP (2009a:1) as “the delivery of financial 
services… using ICT and nonbank retail agents, for example, over card-based 
networks or with mobile phones.” The CGAP paper suggests four factors are 
likely to affect branchless banking worldwide: the changing demographics of 
users, government regulation, crime and the spread of the internet through data 
enabled phones. It also suggests that responses will be highly dependent upon 
country specific factors including competition, the effect of temporary system 
failures, the evolution of viable business models and relations between 
regulators, MFIs and mobile network operators. CGAP (2009b) draws attention to 
another potential driver of change which is the linkage between microfinance and 
innovation in the way governments make direct payments to poor people both as 
employees and as recipients of cash transfers, under the NREGS, for example 
(CGAP, 2009b:6; Adhikari & Bhatia, 2010). Key issues include whether new 
payment mechanisms can be interlinked with more flexible financial products and 
services, and how new modalities for making government-to-people or “G2P” 
payments will affect the messy local politics of patronage that they feed. 
Building on pilot activities in the four Southern States, the Rangarajan 
Committee emphasizes the potential for expansion of the business 
correspondent model, setting the goal to provide a “BC touchpoint in all 600,000 
villages of the country” (Government of India, 2008:52-57). The main objective of 
this is to facilitate cash transactions, and there has been less discussion of what 
role correspondents might play in authorizing loans or managing insurance 
services. CGAP (2009:16) suggests margins for banks and MFIs from such 
services could quickly fall due to excess demand for reliable agents, prompting 
some MFIs to concentrate instead on mobile based technology linked to SHGs. 
Experiences with mobile phones, simplified accounts and smart cards elsewhere 
suggest an even wider array of possibilities, one driver of which will be the 
effectiveness of central government to establish a Unique Identification Protocol 
to enable banks, MFIs, their agents and credit rating agencies to confirm client 
identity quickly at the point of transaction.  
 
Climate change and food security 
The core issue here is the adequacy of the matrix of institutions enabling and 
undermining the efforts of farmers to deal with drought, flood, ill-health and the 
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perennial need to reconcile seasonal fluctuations in income with daily 
consumption needs (Swain, 2006; Sawada, 2007). Their effect on poverty is 
exacerbated by the declining competitiveness of small scale producers, a trend 
likely to be only partly offset by opportunities for diversification linked to growth in 
urban incomes (Harriss-White, 2008). Rising world food prices may benefit larger 
farmers but will exacerbate poverty among the majority of rural inhabitants who 
are seasonally adjusted net purchasers of food. Meanwhile increasing water 
supply volatility will induce further changes in cropping patterns and technology, 
and is likely to accentuate land consolidation, migration and competition over 
legal and illegal non-farm livelihood opportunities.  
Heightened rural livelihood vulnerability has been one factor behind the 
growing prominence of social protection schemes, including the NREGS (Dreze, 
2008), and an important area of research is their integration with microfinance. 
While “no magic bullet” (Shah, 2008), cash rather than in-kind transfers are less 
likely to foster dependence if it makes it easier for recipients to save some of the 
benefits, and indeed borrow against them (see next section). Ray-Bennett (2010) 
provides detailed case-study evidence of how microfinance can also both support 
and exacerbate response to major disasters.  
Another area of potential innovation in response to increased vulnerability 
is the provision of micro-insurance. The key issue is how to align products to 
correlate sufficiently with clients’ actual risks sufficiently to justify them paying a 
premium sufficient to cover costs of payouts, appraisal and claim management. 
The leading products are for protection against death and hospitalization 
particularly in urban areas (Sinha et al. 2007; Devadasan et al., 2010; Dror et al., 
2009; Ranson, 2002; Ranson, et al., 2007). But India has also been a pioneer in 
area-based multi-peril crop yield insurance though the National Agricultural 
Insurance Scheme (NAIS) and its precursors (Mishra, 1996). Linked to seasonal 
crop loans, the NAIS covers more than one in ten farmers in the country (Nair, 
2010:2) making it the largest crop insurance in the world, although also one of 
the most heavily subsidized (Mahul & Stutley, 2010:108). Weather index linked 
insurance has been much touted as an alternative (Mosley & Krishnamurthy, 
1995) that can also be packaged with credit. But its effectiveness is constrained 
by access to sufficiently fine-grained meteorological data, as well as the 
challenge of tailoring and marketing of products to match the highly diverse risk 
profiles of different categories of farmer (Gina et al., 2007; R.Nair, 2010a; 
2010b).  
Microfinance also needs to be analysed in conjunction with finance for 
collective infrastructure investments capable of crowding in private investment in 
livelihoods by enhancing their profitability and reducing their susceptibility to 
climate change. Such activities include irrigation, erosion control, flood defence, 
social forestry and applied agronomic research and technology development. 
Nino-Murcia (2006) suggests that returns to investment in social forestry can also 
be very high. Yet public investment programmes, like NABARD’s Rural 
Infrastructure Development Fund, have attracted little independent research and 
evaluation (Chandrasekhar & Ray, 2005:22). SHG federation can help to build 
capacity for collective action (Ramesh, 2007), but individual loans may also 
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weaken incentives to collective investment, as in the case of groundwater over 
tank irrigation. Unfortunately, research into interactions between private 
investment and collective watershed development on rural livelihoods and well-
being outcomes is again scarce (exceptions include Srinivas & Rao, 1998; Reddy 
et al. 2004). 
A linked and growing issue is the role of rural finance in aiding efforts to 
reduce India’s contribution to climate change carbon equivalent emissions. 
These include mechanisms to finance renewable energy production in the form 
of biofuel, wood, biogas, solar and wind, as well as to pay farmers for fixing 
carbon through agro-forestry, with possible new sources of international finance 
under the Clean Development Mechanism, REDD+ and related initiatives (World 
Bank, 2010:258; Singh, 2008). In addition to evaluating the impact of such 
programmes research is needed into the relative effectiveness of different 
configurations of state, market and civil society in the management of commons, 
such as hill forest tracts (Baland et al., 2008).  
 
4. Research priorities and methodologies 
 
Recent literature on the methodology of microfinance research has centred on 
how to arrive at more reliable estimates of impact. Most of the impact studies 
reviewed in the first part of the last section relied on quasi-experimental designs 
that at best imperfectly raise questions about the extent to which they remain 
subject to selection and other biases. A leading response to these difficulties has 
been increased use of randomized control trials (CGAP, 2010; Duflo, 2006; 
Banerjee et al. 2009; Copestake, 2011). RCTs offer a robust solution to the 
selection bias problem, and the practical implications of the findings they 
generate can often be more easily interpreted than those produced by quasi-
experimental designs. However, doubts persist over the range of problems they 
can be applied to, their cost, ethics and external validity (Ravallion, 2009; Rodrik, 
2008; Copestake et al., 2009). Both Rodrik (2008) and Deaton (2009) argue 
strongly that quantitative research should not be carried out solely for the 
purpose of impact assessment, but also to test and extend relevant theory so as 
to inform decisions over the role of rural finance in contexts that can never 
precisely replicate those subjected to primary research. This highlights the 
importance of combining quantitative research with qualitative methods designed 
to cast light on impact heterogeneity and causal pathways, including unintended 
outcomes and how financial and other ‘treatments’ interact.  
Table 1 contrasts this narrower instrument-specific and policy-oriented 
research with broader and more open-ended research suggested by the well-
being framework presented in Section 2. The narrower agenda is more likely to 
be associated with quantitative impact assessment. It is also more amenable to 
systematic review and meta-analysis. Conversely, the broader agenda lends 
itself to qualitative methods more able to accommodate the role of microfinance 
as one component of complex systems and processes with uncertain and system 
level outcomes. Village level studies, for example, help to highlight the extent to 
which financial relations remain embedded in deep structures of inequality 
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(Ramakumar, 2006; Harriss et al., 2010) and to reveal the combined effect of 
microfinance on the local economy (Mitra, 2007). However, this association 
between responses and methodologies is far from perfect: qualitative research is 
important to framing the narrower agenda, and statistical data is also important to 
the broader agenda. For example, large household surveys remain important as 
a means to monitoring the relative importance of different forms of microcredit 
and debt by region and socio-economic group (Kalamkar, 2005).11  
 
Table 1. Narrower and broader research agendas 
 
 
Driver of 
change 
NARROWER 
Policy-specific or instrument 
oriented research. 
BROADER 
Open-ended or naturalistic 
research. 
Evidence led 
policy reform 
Impact and cost-benefit 
studies. 
Political economy of policy 
processes. 
Popular 
aspirations 
and political 
responses. 
Incorporate a wider range of 
aspiration variables. 
The indirect effects of finance 
on processes of social 
mobilization and public action.  
Organizational 
responses to 
technological 
change 
Evaluation of supply-side 
financial effects of product 
and process innovation (e.g. 
branchless banking) and 
impact assessment of their 
effects on client outreach and 
impact. 
Changing landscapes of 
informal and formal finance, 
including cultural and 
sociological ramifications of ICT 
on institutional interactions and 
personal financial management 
practices of poor people. 
Food 
insecurity and 
climate 
change 
Uptake and impact of policies 
and programmes to promote 
increased output, food 
security, adaptation to climate 
change (e.g. weather 
insurance) and climate 
change mitigation.  
The indirect effects of finance 
on individual, household and 
community level coping 
strategies and livelihood 
adaptation, including socio-
economic differentiation.  
 
The distinction between narrower and broader research perspectives spans not 
only that between quantitative and qualitative methodologies, but also contrasting 
mental models of microfinance. Gravesteijn and Copestake (2010) distinguish 
between three such models: “business first”, “development first” and an 
intermediate “social enterprise” model. Within the first, a narrower research 
perspective would focus on the profitability of both providers’ and users’ 
                                                 
11
 Quantitative studies of well-being outcomes as diverse as contraceptive use, 
child labour use (Sawada, 2006), crop and livelihood diversification (Sarkar, 
2007; Sharma, 2007; Sidhu, 2006), and rural non-farm income (Toor, 2006; 
Micevska &  Rahut, 2008) can produce evidence of possible wider effects of 
credit constraints. 
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businesses. But a business first perspective is also more broadly concerned with 
meso-level and macro-level financial market integration, deepening, innovation 
and regulation. Likewise the development first model encompasses both a 
narrower concern with the impact of microfinance on poverty and a broader 
concern with how this contributes to well-being outcomes at the meso and 
macro-level, by supporting more inclusive growth, for example. Third, the social 
enterprise model is concerned with both the technical feasibility of double-bottom 
line management in MFIs and with the broader political economy of ‘third way’ 
strategies for balancing financial and social goals at the sector level (Copestake, 
2007). 
The distinction between narrower and broader research agendas maps 
more closely onto different ways of thinking about the management of 
development. The narrower agenda is more congruent with viewing microfinance 
as a potential tool for rational implementation of policies of livelihood 
development, poverty reduction and so on. In contrast, the broader agenda can 
embrace research into microfinance as the instrument of ruthless capitalists, 
corrupt public officials and so on. Gulrajani (2009) seeks to break the impasse 
between these “new public management” and “critical management studies” 
perspectives by pointing out the possibility of a “non-managerialist romantic 
development management” practice. This places complexity, uncertainty and 
diversity of interests at the centre of development, along with deliberative but 
unavoidably messy political processes of framing and instituting actions. While 
unable to reconcile all differences this approach at least recognizes and attempts 
to respond to some of them consensually. At one extreme there is a danger of 
focusing too narrowly on policy-driven impact assessment at the risk of being co-
opted into predetermined ideological visions of what microfinance should be and 
could be about. But at the other extreme there is a danger of focusing too broadly 
on political economy and foregoing opportunities to institute more immediate and 
systematic positive change.   
To conclude, this paper has used a well-being regime framework to define 
development in a sufficiently broad way to embrace research into microfinance 
both in development and for development. The broad survey of literature on rural 
microfinance in India has highlighted the value of diversity of analytical and 
methodological approaches to our understanding of the complexity of its relation 
to development thus defined. This has led us to warn against an exclusive focus 
on policy-oriented impact assessment, for fear of crowding out complementary 
research into the adaptive response of microfinance and other forms of rural 
finance to challenges posed by other conditioning factors (including rising 
political aspirations, technological innovation and climate change). In this 
respect, the well-being regime framework employed is located firmly in the broad 
and policy-relevant, but not policy-driven, interdisciplinary tradition of 
development studies.  
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